Foreign Involvement in the 2026 Hungarian Parliamentary Elections
US Interference, Europe’s Mischief, and Orbán’s Collusion with Russia
Hungarian parliamentary elections taking place this Sunday have been marked by various accusations of foreign interference.
In fact, the far-right government of Viktor Orbán has made Ukraine’s alleged interference in the elections the central discursive element of the Fidesz party’s campaign. Hungarian streets are filled with posters that aggressively link Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky to the leader of the main opposition party Tisza, Péter Magyar, suggesting that a vote for Tisza – currently leading in the polls – would drag Hungary into the Russian-Ukrainian war and redirect EU funds away from Hungary to Ukraine.
In early March this year, Orbán’s regime directly accused Ukraine of financing Tisza, without providing any evidence. Days later, Hungarian counter-terrorism police raided Ukrainian armoured trucks transporting cash and gold between Austrian and Ukrainian banks, seizing $40 million, €35 million, and 9 kg of gold, and detaining seven Ukrainians. The detainees were held for over 24 hours under harsh conditions before deportation, and the assets were not returned. Officials claimed the funds were for a “Ukrainian war mafia”.
Hungary’s Minister of Construction and Investment, János Lázár, later openly stated that the seizure of the Ukrainian trucks had been carried out in response to Ukraine’s refusal to repair the Druzhba pipeline used to transport oil from Russia to Hungary. According to investigative reporting, the raid was “designed to manufacture a confrontation with Ukraine that could be exploited” ahead of the parliamentary elections.
But while Ukraine’s alleged “interference” in the Hungarian elections remains an unfounded claim promoted by the Orbán regime – with only 26% of Hungarians reportedly considering it even somewhat likely – several foreign stakeholders have indeed been involved in the elections in Hungary. These stakeholders include the US administration, European intelligence agencies and other institutions, as well as the Kremlin.
Foreign involvement in the Hungarian elections is underpinned by the fact that the outcome of the Hungarian elections will have influence not only on the Hungarian population but also beyond the country’s borders.
Orbán’s regime has been a major disruptor of EU foreign policy on several fronts. Hungary has repeatedly vetoed or delayed critical EU financial and military aid packages for Ukraine. It has also blocked or diluted joint EU statements criticising Russia, Belarus, China, and Turkey, thereby undermining the EU’s ability to present a unified position on international issues. Moreover, Budapest has blocked or watered down EU statements critical of Israel, particularly regarding its actions in Gaza, and has repeatedly opposed sanctions against violent Israeli settlers in the occupied West Bank, despite such measures being supported by a majority of EU member states.
While these are not the only sources of the deep grievances held by the overwhelming majority of EU member states against Orbán, they are likely the main motives driving certain European governments to seek to influence the Hungarian elections in 2026. At the same time, it is widely believed that Orbán’s challenger, Péter Magyar, while not necessarily a champion of liberal democracy, could halt Hungary’s growing divergence from the rest of the EU, restore the country as a responsible member of the European community, and put an end to Budapest’s role as a Trojan horse for illiberal external actors within the Union.
And it is precisely the disruptive nature of the Orbán regime – undermining the coherence and cohesion of EU foreign policy – as well as its role as a Trojan horse for non-European, often anti-European forces, that makes Orbán a valued ally for external actors who would strongly prefer him to remain in power.
Following the pathos of the US 2025 National Security Strategy, which welcomed “the growing influence of patriotic [read: far-right] European parties”, US President Donald Trump endorsed Orbán twice on social media before the administration moved to what can be described as election interference.
Endorsements of politicians by their foreign counterparts are a common feature of election campaigns. While they may be unwelcome to politicians on opposing sides, such endorsements cannot be regarded as election interference, although they do reveal underlying political allegiances.
In February and March 2026, Trump published two nearly identical posts in which he described Orbán as “a truly strong and powerful Leader” who allegedly worked “hard to Protect Hungary, Grow the Economy, Create Jobs, Promote Trade, Stop Illegal Immigration, and Ensure LAW AND ORDER!”. He called on Hungarians to vote for Orbán and offered his “Complete and Total Endorsement” for Orbán’s re-election.
However, the actual instance of the US administration’s interference in the Hungarian elections happened later and consisted of two acts. First, US Vice-President JD Vance travelled to Budapest just a few days before the election day and appeared alongside Orbán at the Fidesz campaign rally. Thus, Vance’s visit to Budapest was clearly timed to influence Hungarian voters, used US state resources to amplify Washington’s support for Orbán, and contained an explicit call to support Fidesz.
The second act concerned Trump’s social media post containing a promise – that Vance dangled in Budapest but never fully developed – that the US administration stood ready “to use the full Economic Might of the United States to strengthen Hungary’s Economy”, and implicitly linked that promise to Orbán’s Fidesz remaining in power in Hungary. Trump’s post, therefore, introduced a material inducement conditional on the outcome of the election, thereby constituting a clear attempt to influence voter choice.
Ironically, while participating in Orbán’s campaign in Budapest to boost Fidesz’s electoral prospects, Vance accused the EU of meddling in the very same elections. His accusations were twofold. On the one hand, he claimed that “bureaucrats in Brussels” had “tried to destroy the economy of Hungary” and “to drive up costs for Hungarian consumers”, all because “they hate this guy”, i.e., Orbán. On the other hand, Vance alleged that “bureaucrats in Brussels” had introduced “digital censorship” and were “telling social media companies what information they [were] giving to Hungarian voters”.
Vance’s accusations against Brussels have already been convincingly debunked. However, his remark about “digital censorship” warrants particular attention in the context of foreign involvement in the Hungarian elections – albeit from a perspective very different from his own.
What he alluded to had nothing to do with Brussels’ meddling; rather, it reflected the opposite dynamic: the European Commission has finally and efficiently enforced the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) and persuaded major social media platforms – notably X (Twitter), Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok – not to allow malign information operations targeting the Hungarian elections to spread uncontrollably.
A curious element of the EU’s enforcement of the DSA – perhaps the first instance of the successful application of this ambitious policy in relation to electoral processes in Europe – is that it appears to have been carried out quietly and “behind closed doors”. Of course, this enforcement did not prevent disinformation campaigns related to the Hungarian elections from appearing on major social media platforms – they did. However, platform operators were induced to remove most of these campaigns in an expedient and effective manner.
Vance’s disappointment is therefore understandable: while the US administration provided overt political support to Orbán, it was unable to leverage the full power of social media to that end.
Yet the fact that Vance levelled false accusations against “bureaucrats in Brussels” does not mean that there has been no interference in the Hungarian elections by European institutions – only that it did not take the form he alleged.
What certain European institutions did was, to some extent, informed by lessons drawn from the US campaign in late 2021 and early 2022 aimed at deterring Russia from launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. At that time, under Joe Biden’s administration, the US – together with its allies in the United Kingdom – declassified intelligence on Moscow’s preparations for war against Kyiv and thereby successfully pre-empted the Kremlin’s shallow justifications for its so-called “special military operation”.
In order to undermine support for Orbán, certain European intelligence services, and possibly other institutions, seemed to have covertly passed on information discrediting Fidesz – gathered through signals intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) – to international journalists. This information concerned long-standing contacts between the Orbán regime and the Kremlin, as well as what was described as “Russian interference” in the Hungarian elections.
Publications based on these tactically leaked materials not only cast Fidesz in a highly unfavourable light, but also helped weaponise against the Orbán regime the historic slogan of Hungarian national-liberation resistance – “Ruszkik haza!” (Russians, go home!) – originating from the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and an end to communist occupation in Hungary.
Yet both the US administration’s attempts to boost Fidesz’s electoral prospects and Europe’s own mischief pale in comparison to Russian involvement in the Hungarian elections. It remains unclear whether this involvement can be adequately characterised as “interference”; rather, what has been observed points not to interference but to a form of (possibly criminal) collusion between Orbán’s regime and the Kremlin.
There have already been revealing investigations into Russian involvement in the Hungarian elections, and it is not the place here to document them all. What is essential to note for context, however, is that Hungarian authorities invited Russian operatives – ranging from Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service to private entities such as the Social Design Agency, linked to the Russian Presidential Administration – to provide covert support for Fidesz in the form of large-scale disinformation campaigns.
Hungary is a member of NATO, and the Alliance’s 2022 Strategic Concept defines Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”. Inviting Russian operatives to assist Orbán’s regime in the elections by illegitimately influencing Hungarian voters, is thus not merely a domestic political manoeuvre, but an effective outsourcing of elements of national sovereignty to a hostile external actor. This is not simply election interference on Russia’s part; rather, it raises the question of whether these actions may amount to “high treason” or “treachery” under the Hungarian Criminal Code on the part of the Fidesz government.
High Treason (Section 258)
Any Hungarian citizen who establishes or maintains contact with a foreign government or foreign organisation in order to breach the sovereignty, territorial integrity or constitutional order of Hungary is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment between five to fifteen years. [...]
Treachery (Section 259)
Any Hungarian citizen who establishes or maintains contact with a foreign government or foreign organisation abusing his state service status or official mandate, and endangers thereby the sovereignty, territorial integrity or constitutional order of Hungary is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment between two to eight years [...].
Election interference has, to varying degrees, become a recurring feature of major electoral contests across Europe. The Hungarian elections are a particularly consequential case, as their outcome is likely to shape developments far beyond the country’s borders. What happens in Hungary bears directly on the coherence of the EU’s foreign policy, the weight of Europe’s geopolitical position in an evolving global order, and the prospects for European strategic autonomy.
At the same time, important differences remain in how external actors seek to influence the vote. While the interventions of the United States and certain European actors, however questionable, appear relatively limited in scope and intensity, the apparent collusion between the Orbán regime and Russia represents a far more serious matter. Insofar as it entails the outsourcing of elements of national sovereignty to a hostile external power – and potentially undermines the constitutional order – it raises concerns that exceed the scope of election interference and call for thorough and sustained investigation.