The Next Europe

Continental power and political renewal, or managed decline?

Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani says that Italy supports Ukraine’s accession to the EU, but that the Western Balkans come first, as they are a priority.

If he truly means that, before Ukraine can join the EU, the bloc needs to admit – and finalise the process of admission of – countries such as Serbia and Bosnia, then I have doubts that Ukraine will become an EU member any time soon.

Ironically, however, membership in either the EU or NATO – organisations that will hardly survive the current interregnum in their meaningful forms – may not be what Ukraine should actually aim for, provided it preserves its sovereignty.

New developments are taking place right now and may result in the emergence of a new European organisation, which I refer to as the “European Imperium”, that would replace the old structures.

These developments are related to Germany pushing a “two-speed” EU, in which a “first-tier” of major economies – in addition to Germany, France, Poland, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands – fast-tracks cooperation on defence spending, industrial competitiveness, and strategic resilience. This core group bypasses the hugely problematic consensus-based decision-making principle of the EU and explicitly aims at strategically reducing Europe’s reliance on the US for its security and defence.

At the moment, it may appear that Europe is shrinking, but if the political reorganisation of the continent is carried out properly, today’s developments may retrospectively come to be seen as the compression of a spring before it is released, giving birth to a new, closer, and deeper unity.

Several factors, however, stand in the way of such progress.

Take Ukraine, for example. The outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian war will exert a long-term impact on the entire European architecture. If Russia succeeds in destroying the sovereign Ukrainian state, the potential new European organisation will not only lose what is currently the sixth strongest defence power in Europe. It may also lose some nations on the Eastern Flank that, in the context of the inevitable curtailment of the US security umbrella and under Russian intimidation, could engage in geopolitical re-alignment and even some form of political surrender to a victorious Moscow.

The widespread allegiance to sub-European nationalisms, which is especially characteristic of the far right but also deeply penetrates centrist politics, is another major hindrance on the road to deeper European integration. To be sure, as the relatively responsible international performance of Italy under the leadership of right-wing populist Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has shown, the far right can take different forms. Yet parties of this persuasion in Germany (Alternative for Germany) and France (National Rally) may prove existentially disruptive for any future European federation.

The inertia and passivity of the mainstream EU elites constitute an impediment arguably even more damaging than the challenges posed by the European far right. While European citizens consistently demand stronger leadership, too many current “leaders” seem more preoccupied with finishing their terms and securing comfortable positions on the boards of industrial, lobbying, and consultancy organisations.

Added to this is France’s deeply disheartening historical rivalry with the UK, Europe’s second strongest military power and a sovereign nuclear state. The UK’s confused identity in relation to Europe and European integration, manifested most recently in the meteoric rise of the extremely Eurosceptic “new Tory” Reform UK party, hardly helps matters. Moreover, the growing distrust between France and Germany – most recently evident in tensions surrounding the implementation of their joint Future Combat Air System project – further complicates developments even within the EU’s “first-tier” group.

While the MAGA regime in the US may present challenges to European unity, as becomes clear from a reading of the new US National Security Strategy, it is unlikely to determine Europe’s trajectory on its own. The deeper and more enduring obstacles to building such unity remain predominantly internal, rooted in Europe’s own political fragmentation, strategic hesitations, and shortcomings in leadership.