If I were on a mission to end Russia's war on Ukraine*, I would push for Crimea and southeastern Ukraine - the area currently under Russian occupation - to be treated as independent states. Obviously, this isn't an ideal solution, and I'm sure it would be unpalatable to most people in Kyiv and unacceptable to Putin, who clearly wants the complete subjugation of Ukraine. However, it would solve a few problems, and I think it would have benefits for all parties involved. (And it's clearly better than what Trump is proposing.)
*This is assuming other countries don't step up to help Ukraine win the war.
The scenario I'm talking about would still leave Crimea under de facto Russian control for the foreseeable future. The potential benefits of taking this route, as I see it, include the point that it would avoid the problems of formal recognition of Russian sovereignty, which all major countries should explicitly rule out; it could potentially allow for a change in status at a distant future date if the people of Crimea were in favour; it would give the people of Crimea some nominal control over their own affairs, including their international relations; and it would be better than being a grey zone, effectively beyond international law, which seems to be the most likely outcome. However, the only country that could realistically push Russia to accept anything like this is the U.S., which is now supporting Russia's position, and even talking openly about recognising Russian sovereignty over Crimea. By taking this position, Trump has reduced the chances of achieving any kind of peace in the near future.
As for the Crimean economy, I'm sure you know much more about this than I do. However, my understanding is that the problems there are due more to exploitation and poor management over many decades than a lack of resources or economic potential. I'm aware there are serious problems with the water supply, among other things, but these can be dealt with. To be honest, I think Crimea could do better as a genuinely independent state with ties to Kyiv, Brussels, Moscow, and Ankara than it would as an outpost of Russia's empire, but the prospects of that are pretty bleak, too.
Do you believe there is any chance of Crimea returning to Ukraine long-term? From the article, it sounds more likely concessions would create a permanent settlement.
I believe that in long term we’ll have much more pressing issues to deal with: advanced technology, climate change, etc. I also trust that, by 2050, national borders will lose much of their current relevance.
No it will not. This belief is fundamentally mistaken. All military, legal and political systems of every state are anchored to and entirely based upon its territorial structure.
That said, this article does properly document useful details of Crimea’s recent history. But all this must be considered within the context of Ukraine’s status as a fledgling democracy. Developing democracies don’t mature overnight; it takes decades. Look at the history of the United States; at inception, voting was limited to wealthy white men. 85 years after it began, the US fell into a civil war! Ukraine’s declaration of independence happened on 24 August 1991, less than 35 years ago. New democracies always begin with weak institutions which must be gradually built up and strengthened over time (aka “modernisation, liberalisation, and Westernisation”).
I’m talking about nations - not states. Nations are imagined communities, and there are more stateless nations in the world than there are nation-states. And the rise of the Internet has already undermined how we view national communities, and I expect that in the future these communities will become even more disperse.
The exemplar of stateless nations is the Kurds. In 1920, the Treaty of Sèvre provided for the creation of a Kurdish state, but it was never ratified; in 1923 the infamous Treaty of Lausanne divided Kurds among four states. Kurds refer to Kurdish areas of Syria as Rojavayê (West Kurdistan), of Iraq as Başûrê (South Kurdistan), of Turkey as Bakurê (North Kurdistan), and of Iran as Rojhilatê (East Kurdistan). Being stateless has made Kurds the victims of everything up to and including genocide (Saddam Hussein’s cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid (‘Chemical Ali’) was tried, convicted and in 2010 finally executed for committing genocide with chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians; at his trial, evidence included his own recorded statement that “I will kill them all with chemical weapons! Who is going to say anything? The international community? Fuck them! The international community and those who listen to them.”). The Internet has enabled Kurds to maintain and increase their sense of nationality. If it was feasible, Kurds would immediately declare themselves an independent state. What makes you think otherwise?
Grateful to Sébastien Gobert for discussing my article "Rethinking Crimea" in his recent podcast (in French): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QVWSuSs-gg8
If I were on a mission to end Russia's war on Ukraine*, I would push for Crimea and southeastern Ukraine - the area currently under Russian occupation - to be treated as independent states. Obviously, this isn't an ideal solution, and I'm sure it would be unpalatable to most people in Kyiv and unacceptable to Putin, who clearly wants the complete subjugation of Ukraine. However, it would solve a few problems, and I think it would have benefits for all parties involved. (And it's clearly better than what Trump is proposing.)
*This is assuming other countries don't step up to help Ukraine win the war.
Balkanisation, while not ideal, could be a solution, but as you correctly observe, Putin wants to destroy the Ukrainian national project as such.
And another point: Crimea is economically unsustainable as an independent state.
The scenario I'm talking about would still leave Crimea under de facto Russian control for the foreseeable future. The potential benefits of taking this route, as I see it, include the point that it would avoid the problems of formal recognition of Russian sovereignty, which all major countries should explicitly rule out; it could potentially allow for a change in status at a distant future date if the people of Crimea were in favour; it would give the people of Crimea some nominal control over their own affairs, including their international relations; and it would be better than being a grey zone, effectively beyond international law, which seems to be the most likely outcome. However, the only country that could realistically push Russia to accept anything like this is the U.S., which is now supporting Russia's position, and even talking openly about recognising Russian sovereignty over Crimea. By taking this position, Trump has reduced the chances of achieving any kind of peace in the near future.
As for the Crimean economy, I'm sure you know much more about this than I do. However, my understanding is that the problems there are due more to exploitation and poor management over many decades than a lack of resources or economic potential. I'm aware there are serious problems with the water supply, among other things, but these can be dealt with. To be honest, I think Crimea could do better as a genuinely independent state with ties to Kyiv, Brussels, Moscow, and Ankara than it would as an outpost of Russia's empire, but the prospects of that are pretty bleak, too.
Do you believe there is any chance of Crimea returning to Ukraine long-term? From the article, it sounds more likely concessions would create a permanent settlement.
I believe that in long term we’ll have much more pressing issues to deal with: advanced technology, climate change, etc. I also trust that, by 2050, national borders will lose much of their current relevance.
Your words in God’s ears - I fear nationalism may prove to be quite persistent.
I’m sure it will persist, but perhaps its territorial aspect will become much less relevant.
No it will not. This belief is fundamentally mistaken. All military, legal and political systems of every state are anchored to and entirely based upon its territorial structure.
That said, this article does properly document useful details of Crimea’s recent history. But all this must be considered within the context of Ukraine’s status as a fledgling democracy. Developing democracies don’t mature overnight; it takes decades. Look at the history of the United States; at inception, voting was limited to wealthy white men. 85 years after it began, the US fell into a civil war! Ukraine’s declaration of independence happened on 24 August 1991, less than 35 years ago. New democracies always begin with weak institutions which must be gradually built up and strengthened over time (aka “modernisation, liberalisation, and Westernisation”).
I’m talking about nations - not states. Nations are imagined communities, and there are more stateless nations in the world than there are nation-states. And the rise of the Internet has already undermined how we view national communities, and I expect that in the future these communities will become even more disperse.
The exemplar of stateless nations is the Kurds. In 1920, the Treaty of Sèvre provided for the creation of a Kurdish state, but it was never ratified; in 1923 the infamous Treaty of Lausanne divided Kurds among four states. Kurds refer to Kurdish areas of Syria as Rojavayê (West Kurdistan), of Iraq as Başûrê (South Kurdistan), of Turkey as Bakurê (North Kurdistan), and of Iran as Rojhilatê (East Kurdistan). Being stateless has made Kurds the victims of everything up to and including genocide (Saddam Hussein’s cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid (‘Chemical Ali’) was tried, convicted and in 2010 finally executed for committing genocide with chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians; at his trial, evidence included his own recorded statement that “I will kill them all with chemical weapons! Who is going to say anything? The international community? Fuck them! The international community and those who listen to them.”). The Internet has enabled Kurds to maintain and increase their sense of nationality. If it was feasible, Kurds would immediately declare themselves an independent state. What makes you think otherwise?